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In January 2010, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton delivered a speech on 
Internet freedom in Washington DC. She spoke of ‘the right of people to 
freely access information’, and said that ‘access to information helps citizens 
to hold their governments accountable’. Her government, she said, stood ‘for 
a single internet where all of humanity has equal access to knowledge and 
ideas’ (Clinton 2010). The limits of this position were to be both tested and 
revealed throughout 2010, as the US administration and the world responded 
to a series of revelations facilitated by the activist whistleblower site 
WikiLeaks. 
 
In April 2010, WikiLeaks released a video they titled ‘Collateral Murder’, 
which they claimed showed civilians, including two Reuters journalists, being 
shot dead by US forces. In July, they provided more than 90,000 classified 
documents from the Afghan war to the Guardian, the New York Times and Der 
Spiegel. This was dwarfed on 23 October, when those same three publications, 
along with Al Jazeera, Le Monde, and UK broadcaster Channel 4 published 
simultaneous stories about the occupation of Iraq. These reports all drew 
upon a cache of 391,832 classified US military documents obtained by 
WikiLeaks. And on 29 November, the Cablegate events began, with the 
publication in five major western newspapers of stories based on 251,287 
secret cables sent from more than 250 US embassies.  
 
This time, the WikiLeaks website came under extraordinary political pressure 
— it lost its access to the domain name Wikileaks.org. Amazon (which 
provided its web space), Paypal, Visa and Mastercard all withdrew their 
services from the organization. A loose coalition of supporters using the 
collective label ‘Anonymous’ engaged in a string of electronic civil 
disobedience actions against the websites of these companies, coordinating 
through spaces such as 4Chan, Facebook and Internet Relay Chat channels. 
The attempts to block access to the WikiLeaks website provided an important 
demonstration of John Gilmore’s famous observation that ‘the Net interprets 
censorship as damage and routes around it’ (quoted in Time, 6 December 
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1993). By 10 December 2010, the entire contents of the site were mirrored on 
more than 1500 other websites.  
 
WikiLeaks shows the contours of the convergent media environment that is 
the subject of this book. The events WikiLeaks initiated in 2010 played out 
through networked digital media, as its ‘Collateral Murder’ video for example 
circulated through blogs, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter and Wikipedia. But 
these events also played out through longer-established industries such as 
newspapers and magazines, through broadcast television and radio, as 
WikiLeaks built collaborations with leading newspapers and broadcasters to 
analyse, distribute and publicize its caches of classified data. This illustrates 
the complex media environment that we now inhabit, an environment built 
on both broadcast and broadband. To say we inhabit this media environment 
is not to overstate the case — at least for those of us in the UK, Australia, and 
North America, which are the parts of the world we focus on in this book. In 
the UK, for example, the average person spends almost nine hours a day 
using media — watching TV, reading newspapers, listening to the radio, 
texting, gaming and using the Internet. More time than we spend asleep, 
more time than we spend at work. On average, 45% of our waking hours are 
spent with media (an average of 7 hours and 5 minutes), and by using more 
than one kind of media at the same time, we cram in an average of 8 hours 
and 48 minutes media time every day (Ofcom 2010: 24). The media are no 




This book is about convergence — the coming together of things that were 
previously separate. More than that, this book is about media convergence in 
everyday life. Other books about convergence variously focus on the political 
economy of contemporary media industries (Dwyer 2010), on establishing a 
research agenda for digital media scholars (Jensen 2010), or on the activities of 
specialized groups of media fans (Jenkins 2008). But in this book we 
emphasize more everyday uses of networked digital media — Facebook and 
iTunes, Google and Wikipedia, and the BBC iPlayer among them. We use the 
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term convergent media throughout the book to refer to media content, 
industries, technologies and practices that are both digital and networked. We 
avoid the term new media (cf. Manovich 2001, Lievrouw & Livingstone 2006, 
Flew 2008, Lister et al 2009, Giddings & Lister 2011). All media were new 
once, and to place an emphasis on the ‘new’ can be misleading. If we 
emphasize technological novelty, then this can obscure the crucial processes 
of transition, of both adoption and adaptation, through which a medium 
comes to seem part of the furniture (Gitelman & Pingree 2003). More than 
this, there are also some very real problems in deciding what is to count as 
‘new’. The World Wide Web is already twenty years old — Tim Berners-Lee 
activated the first website in December 1990 (Berners-Lee 2010). The Internet 
which underpins the web is more than forty years old — the first message on 
the ARPANET was sent in October 1969 (Abbate 1999). The history of the 
mobile phone might be traced back as far as Marconi or even Morse, or 
through long trajectories of development in CB radio and pagers (Goggin 
2006, Ling & Donner 2009), until the first-generation commercial cellular 
phones at the end of the 1970s (Green & Haddon 2009). Some of the earliest 
videogames date to 1958 (Tennis For Two) and 1962 (Spacewar!) (Newman 
2004). Image manipulation application Photoshop has been with us for 
twenty years; word processors, desktop publishing, and email for longer; and 
even the iPod for ten. Are any of these media still new? DVDs and MP3s once 
seemed new, but then so did the telegraph, the telephone and electric light 
(Marvin 1988, Fischer 1992, Standage 1998). At the time of writing, various 
kinds of cutting-edge might be represented by location-based social media 
tools (Foursquare), augmented-reality phone apps (Layar) or legal streaming 
music services (Spotify), but readers in the not-too-distant future are likely to 
find all of those unexceptional. 
 
We also avoid the term digital media in this book, except where we are 
focusing on specific properties of specific digital forms or in conjunction with 
the term networked. We do not use the term ‘digital media’ as a general label 
for the convergent media environment. This is because the digitization of 
media content is now so pervasive and so firmly established that the term is 
unhelpful as a general label. All media now involve digital technologies in at 
least some stages of their production, distribution or reception. Even a 
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centuries-old form like the newspaper, even at its most modest level — the 
local free-sheet — is written on word processors, laid out on desktop 
publishing packages, and sent to its printers electronically. Moreover, the 
significant characteristic of contemporary media is not just that they are 
digital but that they are also networked, enabling complex relationships of 
two-way communication. Convergent media for us, then, are networked digital 
media. 
 
And we avoid the term revolution, which can be used by even the most 
incisive analysts of the convergent media environment (such as Castells 2000 
or McChesney 2007). ‘The rhetoric of the digital revolution’, as Mark 
Andrejevic points out, ‘assumes a fundamental discontinuity between the old 
media and the new’ (2004: 24). Instead, in this book we ground our discussion 
of convergent media in longer historical trajectories, linking news blogs to 
established news organizations, creative audiences to decades of audience 
theory and research, and the increased degree of personal visibility afforded 
by social network media to older issues. 
 
Convergence, Roger Silverstone once suggested, is ‘a dangerous word’ (1995: 
11). Silverstone was concerned that the word had come to mean so many 
different things to so many people, applied to technological developments, 
industry structures, changing forms of media texts, and shifts in the 
relationships between audiences and media. For Silverstone, this was a 
problem, although we would suggest that being able to explain many 
different kinds of media phenomena with a single concept is a useful thing. 
But Silverstone was right that the term ‘convergence’ means different things 
to different people, and perhaps as a result the term also attracts a certain 
skepticism — ‘the promise of further wonders’, as Hesmondhalgh assesses 
convergence (2007: 261). Murdock (2000) made a significant contribution by 
distinguishing between, first, the convergence of cultural forms (which we 
discuss in Chapter 4 as textual convergence); second, industrial convergence 
(to which we turn in Chapter 2); and third, technological convergence, which 
he termed ‘the convergence of communications systems’ (2000: 37-8). This 
third form is our focus in Chapter 1.  
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For Klaus Bruhn Jensen convergence describes ‘a historically open-ended 
migration of communicative practices across diverse material technologies 
and social institutions’ (2010: 15). Jensen identifies three broad modes of 
communication which are affected by this, which he labels ‘the three degrees’. 
The first involves bodies and tools of interpersonal communication, including 
both face-to-face conversation and writing. The second degree he identifies is 
‘technologies’, a label for the few-to-many media forms of the broadcast 
paradigm (although it is not clear how writing, as applied to letters, books or 
email, is free from technological mediation). And Jensen’s third degree is 
‘meta-technologies’, or digital media which remediate and recombine the 
other degrees. Jensen’s analysis is incisive and original, but conflates too 
many important distinctions into its ‘first degree’ — face-to-face 
communication is different in crucial ways from mediated one-to-one 
communication through phones, letters, email or chat, most obviously in that 
those latter kinds of communication usually occur between people who are 
not present in the same place at the same time (Thompson 1995).  
 
Where Jensen is concerned with modes of interaction, others take a political 
economy perspective on convergence. For Tim Dwyer, convergence describes 
‘the process whereby new technologies are accommodated by existing media 
and communication industries and cultures’ (Dwyer 2010: 2). In this analysis, 
networked digital media appear just as a kind of superstructural 
phenomenon on top of the established media industries. The limitations of 
this approach are clear in Dwyer’s case study of MySpace, which sees this 
network entirely as a broadcast platform (2010: 57-9). MySpace has certain 
things in common with certain platforms in the broadcast paradigm, but it is 
better understood as a social media tool which creates a complex 
environment, mixing one-to-one personal communication with the broadcast 
model of messages sent to nobody in particular. We will discuss social media 
in more detail in Chapter 3, which will extend the points raised here about the 
analyses of both Jensen and Dwyer. 
 
Other authors have also stressed the convergence of computing, 
communications and content (Pool 1983, Rice 1999, Barr 2000, Flew 2008, 
Küng, Picard & Towse 2008), generating powerful insights. Bolter and Grusin 
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describe convergence as remediation — ‘the representation of one medium in 
another’ (1999: 45). For these authors, ‘Convergence is the mutual remediation 
of at least three important technologies — telephone, television, and 
computer’ (1999: 224). The importance of their argument is in its insistence 
that networked digital media do not replace older media but join them in a 
complex convergent environment: ‘the remediation is mutual: the Internet 
refashions television even as television refashions the Internet’ (1999: 224). 
But, in contrast, other scholars miss the point of convergence entirely: ‘That 
people can listen to their radio over their digital television — so what? That 
they can make telephone calls on their computers — so what?’ (Winston 2005: 
377). However, in recent years, convergence has become firmly identified — 
even over-identified — with the work of Henry Jenkins (2001, 2004), in 
particular his 2006 book Convergence Culture (references in this book are to the 
updated paperback edition of 2008).  
 
‘In the world of media convergence,’ writes Jenkins, ‘every important story 
gets told, every brand gets sold, and every consumer gets courted across 
multiple media platforms’ (2008: 3). For Jenkins, convergence can be defined 
as: 
 
the flow of content across multiple media platforms, 
the cooperation between multiple media industries, 
and the migratory behavior of media audiences who 
will go almost anywhere in search of the kinds of 
entertainment experiences they want (2008: 2).  
 
The title of his book identifies not only convergence but a convergence culture 
— something different and something bigger than just a set of specialized 
media practices (see also Jenkins & Deuze 2008, Perryman 2008, Deuze 2010). 
For some critics, this relies rather too much on generalizing from the practices 
of very small groups (Couldry 2010a). Jenkins’s case studies largely focus 
around dedicated fans who have the economic and cultural resources to 
engage with their favourite media in unusual depth. Convergence Culture is 
best seen as a contribution to the literature on fan studies, with which Jenkins 
has been associated since the early 1990s (Jenkins 1992, 2006b). Key chapters 
explore online discussion forums surrounding the reality TV show Survivor, 
amateur contributions to the Star Wars canon, and coordinated fan fiction 
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around the Harry Potter universe. This is both the biggest strength of the 
book — its detailed and revealing case studies of fan behaviour — and its 
biggest limitation, because Jenkins generalizes and extrapolates throughout 
the book from the behaviour of particular groups who may not after all turn 
out to be harbingers of wider trends that will diffuse throughout society. To 
devote an enormous amount of time to remaking a Star Wars film, or to fully 
exploring every last nuance of the world of The Matrix (across games, virtual 
worlds and graphic novels as well as the trilogy of films), or to establishing 
oneself as a leading voice in an online forum for Survivor fans — each of these 
demands resources of money, cultural capital, and above all time that 
marginalize the potential for many people to join in (Couldry 2011, Gregg & 
Driscoll 2011). As is true of all literature in fan studies, Jenkins’s examples 
may not, in fact, apply to other, less dedicated groups. We will address the 
changing roles of media audiences in more detail in Chapter 5. 
 
Both Jenkins (2008: 10-11) and Castells (2009: 58) credit Ithiel de Sola Pool’s 
1983 book Technologies of Freedom as the first to draw attention to convergence, 
although from this early vantage point he did not have a great deal to say 
about computers:  
 
A process called the ‘convergence of modes’ is blurring 
the lines between media, even between point-to-point 
communications, such as the post, telephone, and 
telegraph, and mass communications, such as the 
press, radio, and television. A single physical means — 
be it wires, cables, or airwaves — may carry services 
that in the past were provided in separate ways. 
Conversely, a service that was provided in the past by 
any one medium — be it broadcasting, the press, or 
telephony — can now be provided in several different 
physical ways. So the one-to-one relationship that used 
to exist between a medium and its use is eroding. That 
is what is meant by the convergence of modes (Pool 
1983: 23). 
 
And in The Media Lab, Stewart Brand described MIT Media Laboratory 
Director Nicholas Negroponte’s ‘vision’ of convergence: ‘all communication 
technologies are suffering a joint metamorphosis, which can only be 
understood properly if treated as a single subject, and only advanced 
properly if treated as a single craft’ (1988: 11). 




But such technological convergence would have ramifications, which were 
identifiable some time ago. Pool noted, for example, that legal and regulatory 
approaches towards print, telephony and broadcasting systems had all 
evolved separately and distinctly, so their practical convergence would create 
regulatory dilemmas (a point explored in the greatest depth by Benkler 2006). 
The possibilities of technological convergence, when combined with 
increasingly convergent ownership patterns, would effect a blurring of earlier 
distinctions — print publishing, for example, which was subject to one 
specific set of legal conventions, would be increasingly drawn into the 
regulatory domains affecting broadcasting and telecommunications.  
 
Contestation and Continuity 
 
The emergence of WikiLeaks on the political stage was a vivid example of the 
transformation of the media from the broadcast paradigm of the twentieth 
century into a more complex, twenty-first-century convergent environment. 
And yet the WikiLeaks events also point to some crucial continuities. Viewed 
from a certain angle, the WikiLeaks story seems to be all about the new — it 
was a YouTube sensation, a Facebook sensation, a Twitter sensation. But 
viewed from a different angle, the story is one of long-established media 
industries and practices. For one thing, WikiLeaks was also a newspaper 
phenomenon. All the online sharing and argument, all the social networking 
and collaborative chatter, were catalysed by the publication of material 
provided by WikiLeaks to the Guardian, the New York Times and other long-
established news organizations. The convergent media environment, then, is 
characterized by both contestation and continuity. 
 
With the Cablegate developments, WikiLeaks’ figurehead Julian Assange 
became the focus of an international manhunt. Before his arrest in London in 
December 2010 on charges relating to alleged sexual offences in Sweden, a 
string of US political figures had issued threats: Sarah Palin called for him to 
be ‘hunted down like Osama Bin Laden’; one senior Canadian political aide 
called publicly for his assassination. The US government warned university 
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students that discussing WikiLeaks on Facebook could damage their job 
prospects. Providing information to news media was shown to be a new kind 
of thought-crime, whereas story-telling based on that information appeared to 
remain a protected activity — there were no public calls from elected officials 
or political aides for the editor of the Guardian to be assassinated.  
 
With each of the four key WikiLeaks events in 2010, much attention went to 
the nature of the publication rather than to the content of the documents, with 
WikiLeaks itself and Julian Assange in particular the focus of considerable 
attention (see for example Assange 2010a, 2010b, Greenberg 2010, 
Khatchadourian 2010). Many details lent these events an air of radical media 
transformation — the online distribution of such huge quantities of secret 
data; the exotic name of the site itself; and the intriguing figure of Assange, 
who until his arrest was said to be in constant transit, hauling encrypted 
computers in his luggage (some observed that he resembled a hacker 
protagonist from one of William Gibson’s cyberpunk novels). The medium 
and the messenger were in this case as fascinating as the message, leading to a 
certain amount of hyperbole. Journalism scholar Jay Rosen, for instance, 
described WikiLeaks as ‘the world’s first stateless news organization’ (2010).  
 
But WikiLeaks is not a news organization, stateless or otherwise. Placing a 
quarter of a million raw documents on a website is not the same thing as 
producing news, which is an industrial process of creating and distributing 
non-fiction drama, of giving shape and structure to raw information. 
WikiLeaks does not produce news — rather, it is a source of raw material for 
news organizations which simultaneously makes that raw material available 
to anyone through its website. Its role in channeling information to news 
media has more in common with the communication strategies of powerful 
sources like the Pentagon or the Metropolitan Police than with journalism 
(Fishman 1980, Ericson, Baranek & Chan 1989). Where WikiLeaks differs from 
such established sources is in exemplifying what McNair calls the ‘cultural 
chaos’ of a global networked media environment: ‘the possibilities allowed 
[…] for dissent, openness and diversity rather than closure, exclusivity and 
ideological homogeneity’ (2006: vii).  
 
Meikle & Young — Media Convergence 
Introduction 
10 
Assange himself wrote that the project illustrated a new form of ‘scientific 
journalism’:  
 
Scientific journalism allows you to read a news story, 
then to click online to see the original document it is 
based on. That way you can judge for yourself: Is the 
story true? Did the journalist report it accurately? 
(Assange 2010b). 
 
Benkler has described this as the ‘see for yourself’ culture of the Internet 
(2006: 218), enhanced by the link-structure of the web, in which trust, 
reputation and authority do not simply derive from the organization 
providing the news, but also in the capacity to trace their sources for oneself.  
 
One important conclusion to draw from WikiLeaks and its campaign to 
enforce radical transparency on powerful institutions is that it highlights how 
the convergent media environment is characterized by both contestation and 
continuity — new actors and old industries, contending modes of distribution 
and visibility, complex assemblages of networked digital media. To see this, 
ask yourself why WikiLeaks involves established media organizations at all, 
rather than just posting its caches of data on its own website. Those 
organizations bring distribution networks that complement rather than 
replace the WikiLeaks website. They add the credibility and authority of long-
established news brands to what could otherwise be dismissed as a niche 
website with a weird name, and they set the agenda for other news media to 
follow. As an activist project, WikiLeaks wants to bring attention to the 
documents it makes available. News organizations can help with this. Most 
importantly, they bring journalists who — at their best — can analyse and sift 
the raw material, can test evidence and redact details that may endanger 
named individuals, can offer context to help the reader interpret the material, 
and can shape the data into stories, reports and commentaries that make 
sense of the material for audiences who lack, of course, the time and expertise 
to process these hundreds of thousands of specialized documents for 
themselves — although those documents are available online in their raw 
form for anyone who wishes to try. WikiLeaks, then, illustrates a convergent 
media environment — networked digital communication — emerging 
through complex relations of contestation and continuity. 




Such tensions and interplay between contestation and continuity are central 
to the study of media and communication. From one perspective, 
communication is all about contestation, about transformation, about the 
exchange of information and meaning. ‘Communication,’ writes Klaus Bruhn 
Jensen, ‘is the human capacity to consider how things might be different’ 
(2010: 6). Much media use can be understood as the sending of messages 
across space for the management of complex societies (Beniger 1986). 
Messages, information, communication itself are ‘differences that make a 
difference’ (Jensen 2010: 40). But from another perspective, communication is 
also about maintaining continuity, about maintaining society and culture 
through time (Carey 1989), as we share in rituals of simultaneity and story-
telling, from watching X Factor along with millions of distant others to 
sharing video clips on Facebook. In this view, communication is not just 
about bringing about transformation through the dissemination of new 
information, but also about maintaining relationships, about maintaining the 
continuity of cultures through time. 
 
The tensions between contestation and continuity have also animated the 
‘Media Studies 2.0’ debate. This was initiated in polemical online posts by 
William Merrin (2008, 2009) and David Gauntlett (2007, 2009), which argue 
that the study and teaching of media have not kept pace with developments 
in either media technology or in users’ experiences of a convergent media 
environment. In particular, it points to the blurring of the line between 
production and consumption. This debate, in part perhaps because of the 
polemical nature of its first statements, has been fiercely contested (see for 
example Andrejevic 2009, Dovey & Lister 2009, Miller 2009, as well as the 
2009 special issues of Television & New Media, [vol. 10, no. 1] and Interactions, 
[vol. 1, no. 1]) and it is true that it may reify an unreal Media Studies 1.0. But 
it does crystallize the tensions between continuity and contestation — 
between the broadcast era in which ‘some get to speak and some to listen, 
some to write and some to read, some to film and some to view’ Carey (1989: 
87), and the emerging participatory culture which, as Lessig observes, ‘could 
be both read and write’ (2004: 37). 
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This book recognizes and explores the ways in which ‘the people formerly 
known as the audience’ (Rosen 2006) are developing new ways of interacting 
with media — creating, editing, organizing, collaborating, sharing — at the 
same time as the average UK viewer’s hours spent watching broadcast 
television have increased to almost four per day (Ofcom 2010). The 
convergent media environment is making possible an enormous 
redistribution of a certain kind of power — the power to speak, to write, to 
argue, to define, to persuade — symbolic power (Bourdieu 1991, Thompson 
1995, Meikle 2009, Couldry 2010a). For many people, the media are no longer 
just what they watch, listen to or read — the media are now what people do.  
 
Social media platforms such as Facebook, MySpace and Twitter bring 
together different forms of communication and interaction, blurring the lines 
between one-to-one, one-to-many and many-to-many communication. They 
make possible an unprecedented convergence between messages exchanged 
directly between specific individuals and messages sent randomly to nobody 
in particular. It is a communication environment that Castells (2009) 
characterizes as ‘mass self-communication’, although we would distance 
ourselves from the word ‘mass’ here, which has had a problematic status for 
many media scholars for some time — the problem with the word ‘mass’ is 
that it always seems to refer to other people, never ourselves. We all know 
ourselves to be more complicated, more discriminating, more distinctive than 
simply a part of an amorphous mass. As Raymond Williams once argued, 
there are in fact no masses — 'there are only ways of seeing people as masses' 
(1961: 300). Seeing people as masses was very convenient for twentieth-
century media industries — but in the twenty-first century, it is proving much 
harder, as audiences discover their increased capacity to exercise symbolic 
power.  
 
This book explores that media environment, addressing Facebook and iTunes, 
Wikipedia and blogging, lolcats and Hitler remixes, Guitar Hero and political 
videogames. But it is also grounded in the research, insights and concerns of 
earlier approaches to media. The convergent media environment is being 
shaped not only by such emerging transformations but also by contested 
continuities. Established media industries struggle to deal with the shock of 
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the new — a proliferation of competing platforms, a reconfiguration of 
audiences, and a convergent context in which media products can be shared, 
copied and remixed by millions, on a global scale and in real-time. But at the 
same time, assumptions and precedents from the twentieth century persist in 
the shaping of policy and regulation, in debates about censorship and 
subsidy, in struggles over intellectual property, copyright and access. So this 
book also examines examples that speak to continuities — the BBC and 
Rupert Murdoch, discourses of news and of media policy, understandings of 
media audiences, ownership and texts that are grounded in decades of 
research and debate. 
 
About This Book 
 
In this book we first examine four key dimensions of convergence, giving 
each a chapter in turn — technological, industrial, social and textual. In the 
second half of the book, we then go on to explore the implications of these 
forms of convergence for audiences and for governments and regulators. In 
Chapter 1 we focus on the convergence of content, computers and 
communications — the technological convergence of digital networked media 
that enables the computer company Apple to become a dominant force in 
selling music or to team up with Rupert Murdoch to develop a new kind of 
‘newspaper’ for its tablet device the iPad. In Chapter 2 we turn to those 
organizations that are driving and being driven by this, examining some of 
the most important and emblematic media institutions of the convergent 
environment — the BBC, Google and News Corporation. In Chapter 3 we 
explore the rise of social network media, concentrating on Facebook, a 
complex space which enables the convergence of one-to-one communication 
with the broadcast model of messages sent to nobody in particular. In 
Chapter 4 we discuss three key ways in which media texts converge — the 
mash-up model in which texts are sampled, remixed and reimagined; the 
multimedia model in which different textual systems — words, images, 
sounds — come together in the same space on the same device; and what 
Jenkins (2008) has labeled the transmedia model, in which stories and texts 
are dispersed across multiple platforms.  




With these four major kinds of convergence mapped, the second half of the 
book explores some of their most important implications. Chapter 5, ‘Creative 
Audiences’, identifies the key ways in which audiences can now interact with 
media — accessing, organizing, creating, manipulating, collaborating upon 
and sharing media content in the networked digital environment. Chapter 6 
turns to the ways in which convergent media make the invisible visible, 
enabling new power relationships as users monitor, display and connect. 
Chapter 7 looks at some key implications of convergent media for our 
experiences of mediated time and space. Chapter 8 identifies some of the 
main implications of convergent media for policy-makers and regulators. 
 
To some extent these chapter divisions are artificial, as is true of many books. 
Certain key themes occur and recur within more than one chapter, unable to 
be contained within a single discussion, and the book is to be read 
horizontally across chapters rather than vertically as a series of separate, 
unconnected topics. For example, questions of visibility are not confined to 
Chapter 6, which explicitly focuses on these, but also appear in our discussion 
of social network media in Chapter 3 and in Chapter 7 on convergent media, 
time and space. Questions of remix, similarly, are addressed in both Chapter 4 
on convergent texts and Chapter 5 on creative audiences. This is not a bug but 
a feature, and the reader is encouraged to see the book not as a collection of 
connected discussions but as a continuous exploration of networked digital 
media. And of course, the reader will make their own connections between 
ideas as they read. 
